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Abstract
We model personnel policies in public agencies, examining how wages and promo-
tion standards can partially o¤set a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of
public sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political mas-
ters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem,
properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public
sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector,
and develop policy projects. However, doing so requires internal personnel policies
that sort "slackers" from "zealots." Personnel policies that accomplish this task are
quite di¤erent in agencies where acquired expertise has little value in the private sector,
and agencies where acquired expertise commands a premium in the private sector. Fi-
nally, even with well-designed personnel policies, there remains an inescapable trade-o¤
between political control and expertise acquisition.
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I. Introduction
Public sector bureaucracies play a vital role in democracies, because they implement the
programs and deliver the services desired by the electorate. Unfortunately, achieving high
performance in public sector agencies is notoriously di¢ cult. The source of the di¢ culty
is a dual contracting problem between the civil servants employed in public agencies and
the politicians who run or oversee them. On the one hand, the parties can rarely contract
on the e¤ort or performance of the civil servants; on the other, the parties can never fully
contract on the forbearance from self-interested meddling by the politicians. Together, these
two contracting problems make high performance elusive in many agencies. Nonetheless,
some agencies do achieve high performance. We argue that a key factor in their success is
designing internal personnel policies especially wage and promotion standards that build
cadres of highly motivated and capable managers. In this paper we o¤er a model suggesting
how to design government personnel policies.
The bases of the two contracting problems in public agencies are well-known (Wilson
1989). First, performance contracting in public agencies is frequently problematic. The
goals of national security agencies, prisons, schools, police forces, welfare agencies, the diplo-
matic corps, inter-governmental grant programs, and even park services and transportation
departments are inherently multi-dimensional and imprecise. The tasks performed in the
agencies are typically resistant to easy measurement and only tenuously connected to formal
organizational missions. As is now well-understood, this cluster of characteristics makes
performance contracting very di¢ cult or even counter-productive (Holmstrom and Milgrom
1991, Baker 2002). In addition, self-binding e¤orts by politicians to protect employees from
the grossest varieties of political meddling, in the form of civil service prohibitions on easy
dismissal and salary manipulation, limit the use of high-powered incentives in public agen-
cies (Johnson and Liebcap 1994, Maranto 1998, Maranto 2001). So do public sector unions,
which adamantly oppose performance contracting (West 2009, Moe 2011).
Second, political meddling in public agencies is pervasive and unavoidable (Moe 1985,
1
McNollgast 1989, McCarty 2004). Citizens in democracies demand accountability and re-
sponsiveness from public agencies. Politicians, as agents of the electorate, become the princi-
pals of the agencies, either directly (when the agency is actually administered by a politician
or political appointee) or indirectly (when politicians approve budgets and craft enabling
legislation). As the e¤ective boss,the politician-principal can no more contract away her
decision rights in the agency than a CEO can in a rm (Baker, Gibbons, Murphy 1999).
And, inevitably the politician-principal will be tempted to use those decision rights to fur-
ther her own objectives. Not only does this meddling subvert agency missions, it undercuts
the motivation of employees in the agency and can dramatically degrade agency performance
(Lewis 2008).
There are solutions to the dual contracting problem. First, agencies like rms can build
corporate cultures through relational contracts (Williamson 1985, Williamson 1996, Baker,
Gibbons, Murphy 1999, MacLeod 2007). In stable environments, these relational contracts
can mitigate the performance contracting problem in public agencies (Kaufman 1960). They
can also reduce or o¤set the meddling problem (Carpenter 2001, Carpenter 2010). However,
this solution requires the political principal and the public sector agents to engage in long-
term, repeated interactions. In public agencies, governments are short-lived and political
appointees often even shorter-lived (Heclo 1977, OConnell 2009, Dull et al 2012). Short
tenures render self-enforcing relational contracts nugatory.
A second alternative is to attract and then di¤erentially promote or retain intrinsically-
motivated individuals (zealots) who in contrast with purely nancially-motivated slack-
ersnd employment as public sector managers inherently satisfying. Of course, reliance
on intrinsic motivation is also possible in the private sector (Prendergast 2008). But it plays
a prominent role in the public sector, as many have observed (Downs 1967, Kaufman 1981,
Perry and Wise 1990, Golden 2000, Besley and Ghatak 2005, Gailmard and Patty 2007).
If public agencies are to mitigate the dual contracting problem by attracting and di¤er-
entially promoting and retaining zealots, the agencies must have properly designed personnel
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policies. What do such personnel policies in public agencies look like and how do they
operate? These are the questions we address in this paper.
The starting place for our analysis of public sector personnel policies is the following
observation: Although politicians and employees cannot contract on agent e¤ort or principal
forbearance, they can contract on two other dimensions, public sector wages and promotion
standards. Indeed, civil service wage scales are well-dened public information, and promo-
tion standards are generally written and transparent. Moreover, courts have demonstrated
a willingness to use labor and employment laws to enforce agreements on wages and pro-
motion standards. This o¤ers the possibility of using wage scales and promotion standards
strategically to attract zealots and sort them internally from slackers, even in the face of the
non-contractible meddling problem.
Our analysis distinguishes two types of agencies or bureaus. "Type I" agencies are
government organizations in which the skills of the professionals and managers have low
value outside the agency. Type I civil servant positions include mail sort managers at the
Post O¢ ce, conductors at Amtrak, o¢ ce managers at the Department of Motor Vehicles,
meat inspectors at the Department of Agriculture, social workers in the Department of
Human Services, auction managers at the Bureau of Public Debt, and air tra¢ c controllers
at the Federal Aviation Administration. In these agencies, employee skills acquired in the
public sector are specic to the public sector and do not command a wage premium in
the private sector. "Type II" agencies are those government organizations in which the
skills of the professionals and managers have high value in the private sector. Examples
of Type II agency public sector positions include employment discrimination and antitrust
attorneys in the Department of Justice, securities regulators, procurement o¢ cers in the
Defense Department, aerospace engineers at NASA, and bank examiners at the O¢ ce of the
Comptroller of the Currency. In such agencies, the skills acquired in the public sector are
highly valued by private sector employers.
We argue that personnel policies should di¤er dramatically in these two environments.
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In Type I agencies, employees that enter the agency cannot depart for higher paying jobs
in the private sector. Consequently, most become public sector lifers.In this setting, the
key problem is to motivate the zealots and only the zealots to seek promotion as agency
managers, since their high motivation will lead them to work diligently in pursuit of the
agency mission. We show that it is possible to craft a promotion standard and manager-
ial wage that di¤erentially induces zealots to invest in technical and policy expertise and
become high quality managers, even in the face of political meddling. Slackers remain in
the lower tiers of the agency as clerks.We call this sorting behavior promotion screen-
ing.In contrast, in Type II agencies employees that invest in expertise develop a skill set
that commands a premium in the private sector. Thus, both slackers and zealots have an
incentive to invest in expertise. The challenge for the Type II agency is to di¤erentially
retain the zealots post-promotion. We show that appropriately constructed wage ladders
and promotion standards can induce sorting, but in this case managerial sortingin which
the slackers opportunistically depart the agency as in-and-outerswhile zealots remain as
agency managers.
The distinctively di¤erent personnel policies in the two types of agencies result in dif-
ferent wage structures, di¤erent promotion standards, di¤erent career paths, di¤erent politi-
cization levels, and di¤erent rates of agency policy innovation. For example, Type II agencies
will display substantially more turnover than Type I agencies. In Type II bureaus, the de-
partures of slackers will tend to occur after investments in a level of expertise. In addition,
wage schedules will be steeper, and managerial wages higher, in Type II bureaus than to
Type I bureaus.
Illustrative Example. Two bureaus in the same agency, the Department of the
Treasury, illustrate the two di¤erent internal labor markets (ILMs) in action. The rst
bureau, the O¢ ce of Public Debt (OPD), is responsible for designing and executing the U.S.
Treasury Bond auctions, operating direct bond sales to U.S. citizens, and keeping accounting
records for the U.S. debt. Employees in this agency are promoted based on their ability to
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Figure 1: Turnover in Two Bureaus in the Treasury Department
e¤ectively execute and manage these tasks. The skills in this agency, while crucial to the
e¤ective nancing of the U.S. government, have limited value in the private sector. Hence,
we categorize the O¢ ce of Public Debt as a Type I bureau. On the other hand, the O¢ ce
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is a key player in bank regulation. Its bank
examiners develop skills to assess regulatory compliance and the nancial worthiness of the
institutions under the OCCs control. Within the rst few years of their career, the examiners
are expected to pass a rigorous three-part Uniform Commissioned Examination. Thus, bank
examiners develop a series of skills, including risk management, evaluation of asset safety
and soundness, and how to manage a bank from a bank managers perspective, all skills
which have high value in the private sector. We categorize the OCC as a Type II bureau.
The employee turnover rate at the OCC is almost twice the turnover rate at OPD. In
2011, 4.6% of all employees from the OPD departed government service while 8.7% of all
employees in the OCC departed. In Figure 1, we disaggregate the FY2011 departures by
years of service in the federal government for all employees with over one year of service.
Figure 1 shows the employee departures from each agency as a percentage of total employees
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at the agency with the same job tenure in FY2011. The Figure illustrates two di¤erent
patterns. First, OPD employees tend to be lifers. They have very low civil service departure
rates in the rst 20 years of their career. Between 20 and 30 years of service, there is a greater
hazard of civil service exit as generous pension benets vest. After 30 years of service, there
are very high rates of departures as most of these employees end their working careers and
enter retirement. At OCC, the pattern of departures is quite di¤erent. There is substantial
churn in employment in the rst ten years of employment, a low level between ten and twenty
years of service, and similar pattern to the OPD after 20 years of service. It is precisely in the
rst few years of employment that OCC bank examiners sit for the Uniform Commissioned
Examination and reveal to the private sector their expertise in skills that are valuable to the
private sector the same time that many of these individuals depart the OCC. Finally, 8%
of employees at the OPD with 20-25 years of civil service tenure earn more than $150,000,
while 38% of employees at the OCC with 20-25 years of civil service tenure at these same
levels.
This example illustrates the di¤erent patterns of wages and turnover in Type I and Type
II agencies. However, in both kinds of agencies, interference by a political appointee is also
important and will alter agency performance by changing internal personnel policies. In equi-
librium, politicization decreases the intensity of policy-making e¤ort by civil servants, lowers
the agencys promotion standards, decreases the acquisition of expertise by civil servants,
attens the agencys salary structure, and reduces the agencys policy activism.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a model of public sector
personnel policies in Type I and Type II agencies with slackers and zealots. Section III details
equilibria in the multistage game and describe how sorting and screening occurs. We conclude
with some numeric examples. In Section IV, we examine the managerial competence-control
trade-o¤. We o¤er a nal discussion and conclusion in Section V. Appendix A contains
longer proofs and Appendix B contains a table of notation.
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Exogenous Endogenous
Agency Structure: 2 Level Job Ladder Politicization by Boss
Boss-Worker Policy Disagreement Expertise Acquisition by Workers
Private Sector Wages Promotion Standard
Size of Policy Wins/Losses Public Sector Wages
Cost Parameters (training, policy e¤ort) Policy-making E¤ort by Workers
Intrinsic Motivation of Zealots Probability of Policy Innovations
Stay/Exit Decisions by Workers
Manager job satisfaction
Table 1: What the Model of Public Sector Personnel Policies Does
II. The Model
The model has three distinct components: 1) policy-making, 2) the internal labor mar-
ket, and 3) agency design. The policy-making component of the model draws heavily on
Gailmard and Patty 2007. However, that paper treats policy-making as setting a point in
ideological space, as is standard in positive political theory (see e.g., Epstein and OHalloran
1999, Huber and McCarty 2004, Huber and Shipan 2002). In contrast, our analysis of
policy-making closely follows Baker, Gibbons, Murphy 1999 and other papers in Organiza-
tional Economics by focusing on decisions over "projects." We see this modeling technology
as somewhat more descriptive of policy-making in bureaucracies; arguably, it is somewhat
more exible as well. The ILM component of the model draws on perspectives from Per-
sonnel Economics (Oyer and Lazear 2013, Waldman 2013). Investment in human capital
for promotion is important in the model, as it is in Prendergast 1993. However, sorting
slackers and zealots post-employment lies at the heart of our model of internal personnel
policies. In that sense, the model addresses questions raised at the end of Prendergast 2008
and complements the initial employment sorting studied in Besley and Ghatak 2005. The
agency design component is a relatively straightforward exercise in contract theory (Bolton
2004).
As an overview, Table 1 indicates what is exogenous and what is endogenous in the
model.
7
A. Sequence of Play, Information, and Strategies
The players are the head of an agency (the Boss), assumed to be a political appointee,
and a potential employee of the agency (the Subordinate). The Subordinate may be of two
types denoted by  2 f0; 1g, a "slacker" ( = 0) or a "zealot" ( = 1). The signicance of
this distinction will become clearer momentarily, when we detail utility functions, but while
both value wages only zealots value policy. Subordinate type is private information for the
Subordinate.
There are two jobs for Subordinates within the agency, the two forming a career ladder:
an entry-level "clerk" position, and a policy-making "manager" position. In the former, the
subordinate performs a routine task yielding benet v to the Boss. In the latter position,
the manager works to create a policy initiative, a "project," to recommend to the Boss.
If accepted by the Boss, a policy project yields payo¤s X to the Subordinate and Y to
the Boss. For simplicity we assume that the benets take only two values, positive or
negative: XH > 0 > XL and YH > 0 > YL. Importantly, the project payo¤s may di¤er
systematically between the two players, so there is a tension between the preferences of the
Subordinate and those of the Boss. The probability of XH is simply the Subordinates work
e¤ort a:The conditional probability that the Bosss payo¤ is YH when the Subordinates
payo¤ is XH is p = Pr(YH jXH); the conditional probability that the Bosss payo¤ is YH
when the Subordinates payo¤ is XL is q = Pr(YH jXL). Thus, p and 1   q indicate the
similarity between the interests of the two players (1  q will not play a major role in what
follows but p is extremely important). Rejected proposals bring a zero policy payo¤ to both
players, as does no recommendation.
The sequence of play in the model is shown in Figure 2. Nature selects the Subordinates
type  with common knowledge probability  (the probability of being a zealot). The Boss
o¤ers an employment contract specifying wages in both the clerk and manager jobs (wC and
wm, respectively) and a promotion standard e based on a promotion evaluation. In addition,
the Boss decides upon a level of politicization  for the agency.1 Politicization connotes
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a centralized capacity for independent review of a recommended project.2 If the potential
employee accepts employment, he enters the clerk-level job where he performs routine work
and receives the wage wC .3 More importantly, though, as a clerk the Subordinate may invest
in human capital or expertise e 2 [0;1) at cost c(e). The clerk then undergoes a promotion
evaluation, which e¤ectively measures his agency-specic expertise e. If the clerk meets the
promotion standard e, he is promoted to manager; if not, he remains a clerk. In either
case, the employee may then exit the agency in favor of employment in the private sector.4
If promoted to manager and deciding to stay in public employment, the subordinate (now
a manager) decides upon a level of work e¤ort a 2 [0; 1] at cost c(a; e), crafting a policy
project. We dene the Subordinates work intensity as the probability of discovering a good
project, so that a = Pr(XH).
The e¤ort cost of crafting a good project c(a; e) depends on the managers expertise,
so that more expert managers can undertake the same level of work e¤ort at a lower cost
to themselves. Given the results of his work, the manager may recommend the project
to the Boss, or may decline to do so.5 If the manager recommends the project, the Boss
probabilistically learns the payo¤s from the project, depending on the level  of politicization
in the agency. Hence, increased "politicization" boosts the likelihood of an informed policy
review under the independent control of the Boss. The Boss then accepts or rejects the
managers recommendation. Payo¤s then accrue.
Because promoted managers can exit for private sector employment, we must specify
the wages that they can earn in the private sector. Indeed this outside wage, si, plays an
important role in the analysis. We specify private sector wages parametrically, focusing on
two polar cases. In the rst, the human capital acquired by the agency employee is of little
value to private sector employees. For instance, the skills of policy makers in a Department
of Motor Vehicles are not likely to be valued by private sector employers. In this case si
is not increasing in e. We assume si = sc, the clerk-level wage in the private sector (an
extreme assumption but one that captures the essential wage dynamic). We call agencies
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Figure 2: The Sequence of Play in the Game.
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like this "Type I" agencies. In the second case, the skills, knowledge, and contacts acquired
by agency managers are very valuable to private sector employers, who hire the exiting
public sector manager at an "in-and-outer" wage so. For instance, the knowledge of anti-
trust policy makers in the Department of Justice may command a considerable premium in
the private sector. Here si = s0(e) is increasing in e. We call agencies like this "Type II"
agencies. To complete the public-private comparison, we assume there is a mature second
period private sector wage sm for career private-sector employees. For employees of Type I
agencies, si = sc < sm. For employees of Type II agencies, sc < sm but si = so(e)  sm
for su¢ ciently high e: a highly skilled in-and-outer may command as high or higher private
sector wage than a career private sector manager.
It will be seen that the game has 10 distinct stages that can be grouped into three broad
modules. Module 1 concerns agency design, and involves designing the "contract" o¤ered
employees and the selection of a level of politicization by the political appointee heading the
agency. Module 2 addresses the agencys internal labor market, and details the workersinitial
employment decision, employeesinvestment in expertise, the agencys promotion decision,
and employees decision to remain with the agency or depart for the private section. Module
3 examines policy making in the agency, focusing on the policy-making e¤ort of managers,
their recommendations, and the agency heads response. We divide the game into periods 1
and 2. The rst period includes the rst two modules, the second the third.
The following are common knowledge: outside wages (sc, sm, and si [either sc or so]),
the extent of policy agreement between the Boss and Subordinate (p, 1   q)), the value of
projects (XL, XH , YL, YH) and the cost functions c(e) and c(a; e). The promotion standard
e, the wages wc and wm, and the chosen level of politicization  are observed by potential
employees, and this is common knowledge. The promotion evaluation reveals the employees
human capital e to the Boss but a potential outside employer can only observe whether the
employee was promoted or not. The subordinates policy e¤ort a is not observed by the Boss
(otherwise, managerial wages could be contractible in policy e¤ort).
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For the Subordinate, strategies include 1) a contract acceptance strategy; 2) an expertise
investment strategy e; 3) an exit or stay strategy following the outcome of the promotion eval-
uation; 4) a policy e¤ort strategy a (for promoted employees who remain with the agency);
and 5) a policy recommendation strategy r. For the Boss strategies include 1) a clerk wage
strategy setting wc; 2) a manager wage strategy setting wm; 3) a promotion standard strat-
egy setting e; 4) a politicization strategy setting , and 5) a decision strategy d for policy
recommendations.
B. Utilities
The payo¤s to the Boss and Subordinate are the sum of the payo¤s accruing in Periods
1 and 2.
For the Boss, the period 1 payo¤ is
uB1 =
8><>: v   wc if the worker accepts the contract0 if the worker rejects the contract
where v is the value to the Boss of clerk services. The Bosss period 2 payo¤ is
uB2 =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if the worker accepted the contract but leaves
v   wc if the worker accepted, was not promoted and stays
rdY   wm if the worker accepted, was promoted and stays
where r is the managers project recommendation (either 0 or 1), d is the Bosss decision on
the recommendation (either 0 or 1), and Y is the value to the Boss of the project (either YL
or YH).6
For the Subordinate, the period 1 payo¤ is
us1 =
8><>: wc   c(e) if the worker accepts the contractsc if the worker rejects the contract
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The period 2 payo¤ is
(1) us2 =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
sm if contract rejected in period 1
sc if contract accepted, not promoted, and left
wc if contract accepted, not promoted, and stayed
si if contract accepted, promoted, and left
wm + rdX   c(a; e) if contract accepted, promoted, and stayed
where again r is the recommendation and d is the Bosss decision on the recommenda-
tion.
In what follows, we impose considerable structure on the two cost functions and (as
explained above) the outside wages. In particular we assume that the cost of expertise
investment c(e) = ke2 (so c(0) = 0, c> 0 and c00 > 0 when e > 0), and we assume the cost
of work e¤ort c(a; e) = a2 where  = 1=e. For Type I agencies, we assume outside wage
si = sc so investment in policy expertise brings no increase in outside wages. For Type II
agencies, we assume si = so(e) = sc + e2 so that so(0) = sc but (demonstrated) policy
expertise boosts outside wages. Both are polar assumptions but distinguish clearly between
two wage dynamics.
Intrinsic Motivation. The utility function in Equation 1 embeds a distinct notion
of non-pecuniary motivation: some public sector employees zealots ( = 1) internalize a
sense of organizational mission and receive satisfaction from furthering that mission in the
decisions over which they bear responsibility. Thus, they "take ownership" of agency deci-
sions in their bailiwick.7 In contrast, slackers ( = 0) do not internalize the agencys mission
and do not take ownership of the decisions in their domain of responsibility; their motivation
is purely pecuniary. Hence, in Equation 1, a promoted zealot with policy responsibility has
a term in his utility function, rdX, that a similarly positioned slacker does not. We further
assume zealots do not take ownership of decisions over which they have no responsibility,
for example, if they are never employed by an agency they do not internalize its mission
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and do not feel responsible for its decisions (though they may agree or disagree with them).
Consequently, a zealot who pursues a purely private sector career does not have the term
rdX in his utility function. And, we assume a promoted zealot who leaves the agency does
not have this term in his utility function once he becomes a private sector employee. This
may be rationalized in two ways. First, the feeling of ownership of agency decisions, even
in ones former bureau, is likely to decay over time given separation from the the agency.
In a two-period model, we capture this decline in stylized form with very fast discounting.
Second, the vacancy in the management position prevents the agency from implementing a
project, so that X = 0.8
This form of non-pecuniary motivation  "decision ownership"  in somewhat novel
(however see Vlaicu andWhallen 2012). But it is very closely related to "mission satisfaction"
which arises from project success when a worker is employed by an agency with a valued
mission (Besley and Ghatak 2005). However, decision ownership allows for a degree of
policy conict between the manager and an agency head. Formally, decision ownership is
quite similar to standard non-pecuniary aspects of a job, such as exible hours or on-site
day care, that are valued by some employees but not others (Lazear 1998, Chapter 14) and
may be analyzed in a similar way. The assumption that zealots internalize agency missions,
rather than arrive with their own sense of mission, has ties with the literature on identity and
organizations (Akerlof and Kranton 2005). This assumption allows us to sidestep ideological
sorting across agencies by committed ideologues, but this is clearly an avenue for future
research.
C. Career Paths and Wage Ladders
Figures 3 and 4 trace possible career paths and facilitating comparisons of wages.
The critical feature of the Type I environment is that a promoted public sector manager
cannot depart the agency for a well-paying job in the private sector, as his investment in
expertise has little outside value. In the extreme, his only outside option is an entry-level
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Figure 3: Career Paths in the Type I Environment
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Figure 4: Career Paths in the Type II Environment
position in the private sector.
The critical feature of career paths in the Type II environment is that a promoted public
sector manager can exit as an in-and-outer into a lucrative job in the private sector that
abundantly rewards his investment in expertise.
III. Equilibrium
Although the construction of equilibria is somewhat involved, the following points may
clarify the basic logic. With respect to policy-making, the Boss will adopt either a credulous
or skeptical stance to the managers recommendations, depending on whether there is low
or high conict between them. Politicization in the former case creates an Aghion-Tirole
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e¤ect, that is, it undermines the managers motivation to work hard. But in the latter case,
politicization creates a reverse Aghion-Tirole e¤ect, inducing greater motivation to work
hard. Both politicization and the degree of interest convergence or conict between the
manager and Boss have powerful e¤ects on the managers job satisfaction, with profound
implications for the operation of personnel policies.
With respect to personnel policies, in Type I agencies outside wages are unresponsive
to expertise acquired in the agency. Consequently, the agency must set managerial wages to
compensate an employee for her investment costs if she is to acquire expertise. Critically,
zealots receive job satisfaction from occupying a policy-making billet, and this utility wedge
between them and slackers allows the agency to set managerial wages that motivate zealots to
seek promotion but fail to motivate slackers, hence expertise screening. Thus, in an expertise
screening equilibrium, slackers do not invest in expertise and are not promoted while zealots
do invest, are promoted, and remain in the agency.
In Type II agencies, outside wages are highly responsive to expertise acquired in the
agency. The agency must respond to these outside opportunities as it sets managerial wages
if it is to retain employees. But again, the utility wedge between zealots and slackers allows
the agency to set wages that will motivate zealots to remain with the agency but will fail
to do so for slackers; hence, managerial sorting. In a managerial sorting equilibrium, both
slackers and zealots invest in expertise and are promoted, but slackers then leave the agency
for greener pastures in the private sector. In contrast, zealots remain in the agency.
With respect to the Bosss design decisions, the following points may be helpful. For a
given promotion standard and a given politicization level, the wage structure in the agency is
tied down by the outside wages, the expertise screening and managerial sorting conditions,
participation constraints for employees, and economizing behavior by the Boss. Conse-
quently, for a contract impelling the desired behavior by the employee, the Boss sets the




Manager Recommendations and Boss Decisions.We begin by analyzing the
play of the game after a manager (a promoted Subordinate) has undertaken his work e¤ort
a (which may be zero). One of four states then prevails, and the manager knows which one:
(XH ; YH), (XH ; YL); (XL; YH), and (XL; XL). The Boss does not know which state exists.
A recommendation strategy r maps the type of the manager (slacker or zealot) and these
four states into a positive or negative recommendation (that is, the manager recommends
the project he has uncovered, if any, or he does not). The managers objective is to set this
recommendation strategy to maximize rdX (see Equation 1).
Following a positive recommendation, with probability  the Boss becomes informed
and learns which state prevails. If he is informed, a decision strategy d maps the four states
into an accept/reject decision. If he is not informed, the Boss can condition his decision only
on the facts that the manager passed the civil service exam and has now made a positive
recommendation. Let  2 fYH ; YL;?g (the Bosss information set) where ? connotes the
uninformed state for the Boss.
Lemma 1. (Project Recommendations and Decisions). For the manager:
r(X; Y ; ) =
8><>: 1 (recommend) if  = 1 (zealot) and X = XH0 (dont recommend) otherwise
For the Boss: If p  p
d(; p) =
8><>: 0 (reject) if informed and  = YL1 (accept) if  = YH or ?
If p < p
d(; p) =
8><>: 1 (accept) if informed and  = YH0 (reject) if  = YL or ?
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where p    YL
YH YL .
Proof. See Appendix A.
The Lemma indicates that a zealot-type manager recommends only projects he favors,
and always does so. The Bosss acceptance strategy varies radically between the low con-
ict environment (p  p) and the high conict environment (p < p). In the low conict
environment, the Boss always accepts the managers recommendation unless the Boss re-
ceives independent adverse information from his own centralized review. Hence, this is a
credulous acceptance strategy. In the high conict environment, the Boss always rejects the
managers recommendation unless the Boss receives independent favorable information from
his own centralized review. So, if his independent review reveals nothing, the Boss rejects
the managers "pig in the poke." This is a skeptical acceptance strategy.
Managers Policy-making E¤ort. In deciding on a level of work a, the manager
takes as given the level of politicization  and the cost-of-e¤ort parameter  = 1=e. From
his perspective, the ex ante probability of each (X; Y ) state is:
Pr(XH ; YH) = ap
Pr(XH ; YL) = a(1  p)
Pr(XL; YH) = (1  a)q
Pr(XL; YL) = (1  a)(1  q)
Given the strategies in Lemma 1, if p  p the manager seeks to maximize
wm +  [(apXH) + (1  )(ap+ a(1  p))XH ]  a2(2)
= wm + a(1  (1  p))XH   a2
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However, if p < p the manager seeks to maximize
(3) wm +  [(apXH) + (1  )0]  a2
Lemma 2. (Policy-making E¤ort) For a promoted Subordinate optimal policy-making e¤ort
is:












if p < p
where p    YL
YH YL .
Proof. i) A slacker ( = 0) clearly undertakes no policy e¤ort as it brings no utility gain
and an e¤ort loss. ii) For a zealot ( = 1), the indicated results follow immediately from the
rst order condition for the managers optimization programs Equation 2 and Equation 3.
Comment: A corner solution a = 1 is possible. Using Lemma 4 and Equation 6, one can
verify that as long as the following conditions hold, a is an interior solution even when  is
determined endogenously by e : eXH  2 and X3H  16. QED
Note that a slacker undertakes no e¤ort, while a zealot undertakes positive e¤ort for
any level of politicization in both regimes (except  = 0 in the high conict environment).
In Section V, we consider the general equilibrium e¤ects of policy conict. But it is
worth noting the partial equilibrium e¤ects of an increase in politicization, , on work e¤ort
a. From inspection of Equation 4, in the low conict environment (p  p) the manager works
less as politicization increases. This is an example of the well-known Aghion-Tirole e¤ect
in which meddling by the Boss reduces work e¤ort by the agent (Aghion and Tirole 1997).
However, the situation is quite di¤erent in the high conict environment (p < p). There,
increased politicization brings greater e¤ort by the manager, a reverse Aghion-Tirole e¤ect.
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The explanation is simple. In the high conict environment, the Boss employs a skeptical
acceptance strategy, in which he rejects all recommendations unless he receives corroboration
that the recommended project is a good one (Y = YH). Consequently, politicization (the
probability of independent corroboration) increases the marginal return to the manager from
policy work.
B. The Internal Labor Market
We now turn to the decision of subordinates to join the agency, the decision to remain
employed there rather than exit for the private sector, the agencys promotion decision, and
subordinatesacquisition of human capital.
The Exit or Stay Decision Following the Promotion Evaluation. After the
promotion evaluation, the Subordinate must decide whether to stay in the agency or leave
for the private sector (reference to Figures 2 and 3 may be helpful). There are four potential
classes of employees: a promoted zealot, a non-promoted zealot, a promoted slacker, and a
non-promoted slacker. That is, a zealot-type manager, a zealot-type clerk, a slacker-type
manager, and a slacker-type clerk.9 Each compares the expected value of remaining in the
agency, with exiting and receiving the outside wage. For a newly promoted manager, the
outside wage is si (whose value is either sc in a Type I agency or so = sc + e2 in a Type II
agency). For a non-promoted clerk, the outside wage is sc.
The expected utility of staying is easily calculated. First consider a zealot-type manager
( = 1). Substituting Equation 4 into Equations 2 and 3, yields the expected utility of staying










2 if p < p
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It proves convenient to dene:










2 if p < p
So Equation 5 becomes
Eus2j(stay;  = 1) = wm +


= wm + e
The term 

indicates the non-wage job satisfaction (intrinsic motivation) received by a
zealot who holds a policy-making position. Note that 

must be non-negative.
Now consider a slacker-type manager ( = 0). Such a subordinate does not value policy
(moreover, via Lemma 2 he undertakes no policy work and consequently would not nd an
XH project in any case). Given this, his expected utility from staying is simply his wage wm.
Similarly, a passed-over slacker-type clerk will not undertake any investment in expertise
since there is no opportunity for promotion. Hence, his expected utility is simply his wage
wc. Finally, consider a zealot-type clerk. Because he was not promoted, the manager job
remains unlled so no manager recommends a project. Hence the expected policy value of
agency action is zero. And without the prospect of promotion, the passed-over zealot-type
clerk will not invest in human capital. Hence, his expected utility in the second period is










if promoted and p < p
wc if not promoted
Lemma 3. (Exit or Stay Decision after Promotion Evaluation) a) If p  p (low conict
environment) a zealot-type manager will remain with the agency if and only if 1

 si wm;
b) If p < p (high conict environment) a zealot-type manager will remain with the agency
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Figure 5: The post-promotion decision to stay or go (Type II agencies).
if and only if 2

 si   wm; c) A slacker-type manager will exit the agency if and only if
si  wm; c) Non-promoted subordinates will remain with the agency if and only if wc  sc.
Proof. Follows from comparison of the expected utilities in Equation 7 with the outside
wages for clerks and managers (sc and si, respectively). QED
An implication of the Lemma is that managerial sorting will occur if
(8) wm < si  wm + (; p)

If this managerial sorting condition holds, promoted zealots will stay in the agency but
promoted slackers will exit. Conversely, if the post-promotion outside wage si < wm sorting
cannot work since both slackers and zealots, if promoted, will remain with the agency. The
managerial sorting condition will also fail if wm +


< si, since then both slackers and
zealots will leave the agency for the private sector. Note that in a Type II agency, where
si = so = sc + e, the minimum wage that induces managerial sorting is wm = sc + e  e.
Retention of non-promoted subordinates requires that the agency pay clerks at least as well
as the private sector wc  sc.
Figure 5 provides some intuition about managerial sorting in Type II agencies. As
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shown, the outside wage is so, the horizontal dashed line in the gure, which is the utility of
employment in the private sector for both the slacker and the zealot. If a promoted zealot
remains in the agency her utility, wm + e, increases in the agencys managerial wage wm.
If wm is less than w0m, the utility from private-sector employment is greater than that from
public-sector employment so the zealot leaves the agency. But, for higher wm, she remains. A





so that wages in the interval [w0m; w
00
m) will induce the zealot to remain with the agency but
the slacker to exit for the private sector. Straightforwardly, w0m = so   e.
Expertise Acquisition and Promotion. In order to be promoted, a clerk must
acquire expertise at least as great as the promotion standard e. How much expertise to
acquire depends on the agencys wage structure, promotion standard, and politicization of
decision-making, as well as on the outside wage opportunity after promotion.
It is straight-forward to nd the optimal level of investment, given a contract (wc; wm; e),
outside wages, a level of politicization  and degree of conict p. In doing so, several facts are
useful. First, in both a Type I and Type II agency, prior to investment the expected value
to a zealot of investing, being promoted, and remaining in the agency is wm + (p)e   ke2
while that of a slacker is wm   ke2:Second, in a Type II agency if a promoted manager
departs for the private sector her outside wage will be set assuming e = e. This follows
from the assumption that the private employer can only observe the fact of promotion, not
the employees actual evaluation or investment. Hence, prior to investment, in a Type II
agency the expected value of investing, being promoted, and departing is so(e) ke for both
a slacker andr zealot.
Lemma 4. Strategies for Investment in expertise are: 1) In a Type I agency
e( = 0) =
8><>: e if wm   ke
2  max fsc; wcg
0 otherwise
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e( = 1) =
8>>>><>>>>:
e if wm + e  ke2  max fsc; wcg and e  2k

2k
if wm + 14
2
k
 max fsc; wcg and e < 2k
0 otherwise
2) In a Type II agency
e( = 0) =
8><>: e if max fwm; sog   ke
2  max fsc; wcg
0 otherwise
e( = 1) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
e if
8><>: maxfwm + e; sog   ke
2  max fsc; wcg and e  2k
so   ke2 > wm + 14 
2
k
;max fsc; wcg and e < 2k

2k
if wm + 14
2
k
 so   ke2;max fsc; wcg and e < 2k
0 otherwise
Proof. See Appendix A.
The lemma has an important implication in Type I agencies: If a Type I agency sets
managerial wages properly, only zealots will invest. The following Corollary indicates this
"promotion screening" wage.
Corollary 5. In a Type I agency if
(9)
maxfwc; scg+ ke2   e if e  2k
maxfwc; scg   14 
2
k
if e < 
2k
9>=>;  wm < maxfwc; scg+ ke2
then zealots acquire expertise and are promoted and remain in the agency while slackers do
not acquire expertise and are not promoted.
Proof. Using the Lemma, if a slacker is not to invest in expertise In a Type I agency it must
the case that wm   ke2 < max fsc; wcg. Conversely, if a zealot is to invest in expertise and
remain with the agency it must be the case that wm +e  ke2  max fsc; wcg when e  2k ,
25
Figure 6: The Investment Decision in Type II Agencies
and wm + 14
2
k
 max fsc; wcg when e < 2k . Equation 9 simply re-states these conditions.
QED
Equation 9 indicates a set of managerial wages that will induce a zealot in a Type I
agency to invest in expertise up to or beyond the promotion standard and then remain in the
agency, but will not do so for the slacker. Equation 9 thus provides the promotion screening
condition for Type I agencies. If this condition holds, zealots will invest in expertise and
be promoted but slackers will not. The condition exploits the fact that zealots receive job
satisfaction from the policy making job while slackers to not. Hence, one can pay a wage
that compensates zealots for their e¤orts, but will not compensate slackers for theirs.
Figure 6 provides some intuition about investment decisions in Type II agencies. A
slacker compares the wage from investment, promotion and exit (s0   ke2, the horizontal
dashed line in the gure) with the wage from not investing (maxfsc; smg, the gray horizontal
line in the gure). If s0   ke2  maxfsc; smg (so the dashed line is above the horizontal
line in the gure), this option is attractive. But the slacker must also compare the expected
utility of investing and exiting with the utility from investing and staying, that is, s0   ke2
with wm ke2: The slacker will invest, be promoted, and exit if wm < wm= s0. The wage wm
is not shown in the gure, but note that it is the same wage shown in Figure 5.The zealots
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Table 2: EU of Slacker-type Upon Joining the Agency
Stay Exit
Invest wc + wm   ke2 wc + si   ke2
Dont Invest 2wc wc + sc
Table 3: EU of Zealot-type Upon Joining the Agency
Stay Exit
Invest wc + wm + e  ke2 wc + si   ke2
Dont Invest 2wc wc + sc
expected utility from investing, being promoted, and remaining in the agency is shown by
the upward sloping line in Figure 6. If wm < wm the zealot will invest, be promoted, and
exit the agency. If wm  wmthe zealot will invest, be promoted, and remain in the agency.
Note that this wage is again exactly that shown in Figure 5.
Initial Employment Decision. A potential employee compares his expected utility
from employment in the government agency, with his expected utility from employment in
the private sector. If he is to accept employment with the agency, the return from the ensuing
public career must be at least as good as that from a private sector career.10 The expected
utility of a private sector career is sc + sm Hence, it must be the case that a public career
yields at payo¤ of at least sc + sm:(Recall that sm is the expected net payo¤ in the second
period in the private sector, which reects promotion probabilities, cost of human capital
investment in the private sector, and so on).
The expected utility of a public career depends on whether the employee invests in
human capital and receives promotion, or doesnt invest and isnt promoted (as indicated by
Lemma 4), and whether the employee exits or remains in the agency after the promotion/no
promotion event (as indicated by Lemma 3). There are thus four possible public sector
careers, each with a specic utility. These possible careers and associated utilities are shown
in Tables 2 and 3, the rst table for slackers, the second for zealots. In any equilibrium in
which one of these eight careers occurs, the payo¤ from that career must yield at least sc+sm
if the potential employee is to enter the public sector.
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We now consider the implications of this fact in two candidate equilibria. In a promotion
screening equilibrium, we conjecture that slackers do not invest in expertise to the promotion
standard and are not promoted, but remain with the agency. In contrast, zealots do invest,
are promoted, and remain with the agency. In amanagerial sorting equilibrium, both slackers
and zealots invest and are promoted. But then, the slackers exit while the zealots remain.
Lemma 6. 1. In the conjectured promotion screening equilibrium, a) wc  sc+sm2 and b)
if the entry wage is set so slackers are indi¤erent between a public and private career, then
wm + e  ke2  wc. 2. In the conjectured managerial sorting equilibrium, if employees are
indi¤erent between a public and private career then a) wm + e = si and b) if si  ke2 rises
(falls) in e than wc must fall (rise) in e.
Proof. See Appendi A.
C. Agency Design
We now turn to the Bosss design of the agency. We examine Type I and Type II agencies
separately, though the two analyses parallel one another closely. Broadly speaking, in Type
I agencies a contract that induces promotion screening is very attractive to the Boss. This
contract is not feasible in Type II agencies, so a contract that induces managerial sorting
becomes very attractive. In both cases, the need to e¢ ciently induce screening or sorting ties
down the managerial wage function, given levels of politicization and a promotion standard.
Given this, the Boss sets the politicization level and promotion standard to maximize his
utility, taking into account the e¤ects on policy-making.
Type I Agencies. In the rst period, the Boss receives a payo¤ v   wc (conditional
on an employee accepting employment in the agency). Table 4 indicates the payo¤s to the
Boss in the second period from possible second period careers of a slacker and zealot (the
rst payo¤ in the parenthesis occurs when the employee is a slacker, the second if he is a
zealot, and EY indicates the expected policy payo¤ from a zealots work e¤orts). Without
a formal proof, we assert that the best payo¤ for the Boss comes from a contract inducing
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Zealot
Slacker Public Manager Public Clerk Private Clerk
Public manager ( wm; EY   wm) ( wm; v   wc) ( wm; 0)
Public clerk (v   wc; EY   wm) (v   wc; v   wc) (v   wc; 0)
Private clerk (0; EY   wm) (0; v   wc) (0; 0)
Table 4: The Bosss Second Period Payo¤s from the Second Period Careers (Type I Agency)
a slacker to remain a public clerk, but inducing a zealot to become a public sector manager
and remain in the agency. (Note that screening avoids paying slackers to invest in expertise,
a pointless endeavor since they will not engage in policy work if promoted. Moreover, the
least cost screening wage is actually lower than the least-cost non-screening wage (that is,
one that induces slackers to invest as well as zealots)).
We now derive the Bosss expected utility in the design variables. In a screening equi-
librium in a Type I agency, if the employee is a zealot then the Bosss expected utility in the
second period is, if p  p
EuB2 j( = 1) = EY   wm
= (apYH) + (1  )(apYH + a(1  p)YL)  wm
= a(pYH + (1  )(1  p)YL)  wm
If p < p then it is
EuB2 j( = 1) = EY   wm
= (apYH) + (1  )(0)  wm
so that
(10) EuB2 j( = 1) =
8><>: a
(pYH + (1  )(1  p)YL)  wm if p  p
(apYH)  wm if p < p
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Let  denote the proportion of zealots in the employment pool. Then the Bosss expected
utility at the design stage is just the rst period utility plus the expected second period utility:
EuB = v   wc + (1  )(v   wc) + (EuB2 j( = 1))
= (2  )(v   wc) + (EuB2 j( = 1))
Clearly the values of  and e that maximize EuB2 also maximize Eu
B
2 j( = 1) (provided
wc is not a¤ected by the values of those variables, a point we return to below). Returning
then to Equation 10, recall the denition of a from Lemma 2 (Equation 4), recall that
 = 1=e, and recall the denition of  (Equation 6). Further (recall that the least-cost
promotion screening wage is wm = wc +ke2 e: Combining these with the denition of the
least-cost screening wage yields:
















e  ke2   wc if p < p
Optimal values of  and e may now be found straightforwardly and are indicated in the
following lemma.
Lemma 7. In a Type I agency the optimal level of politicization and optimal promotion
standard are:
(p; YH ; YL; XH) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if p < p
XH+2YL+p(YH YL)
(1 p)(XH+2YL) if p
  p  p
0 if p > p
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if p < p
 p2XH(YH YL)2
(XH+2YL)8k
if p  p  p
XH(XH+2(p(YH YL)+YL))
8k
if p > p





The lemma introduces a new condition, p   XH+2YL
YH YL . At this level of interest con-
vergence, the optimal level of politicization goes to zero.
Now consider the entry level wage, wc. Recall sm; the net expected payo¤ in the second
period from pursuing a private sector career. This value reects promotion probabilities, the
e¤ort costs of investment in human capital, and so on.
Lemma 8. (Type I Agency Entry Level Wage) In a Type I agency where  and e are
set according to Lemma 7, then wc = sc+sm2 assures both slackers and zealots accept initial
employment with the agency.
Proof. Slackers employed in the agency do not seek promotion and thus receive 2wc. The
relevant participation constraint is thus 2wc  sc+sm and the least-cost entry wage satisfying
this wc = ss+sm2 . For zealots, the equilibrium is constructed so that a zealot employed by
the agency is just indi¤erent between investing in expertise and being promoted, and not
investing. Hence the same participation constraint applies. QED
If the average private sector wage prole is increasing, the lemma implies that entry-
level wages in the public sector will be somewhat higher than entry-level wages in the private
sector
We can now combine results to indicate the promotion screening equilibrium in Type I
agencies.
Proposition 9. In a Type I agency the following is an equilibrium. The Boss o¤ers the
contract (wc; wm; e) and then chooses a level of politicization ; where wc = sc+sm2 ; wm =
31
Zealot
Slacker Public Manager Private Manager Public Clerk Private Clerk
Public manager ( wm; EY   wm) ( wm; 0) ( wm; v   wc) ( wm; 0)
Private manager (0; EY   wm) (0; 0) (0; v   wc) (0; 0)
Public clerk (v   wc; EY   wm) (v   wc; 0) (v   wc; v   wc) (v   wc; 0)
Private clerk (0; EY   wm) (0; 0) (0; v   wc) (0; 0)
Table 5: The Bosss Second Period Payo¤s from Second Period Careesr (Type II Agency)
ke2 (p)e+wc and e and  are dened in Lemma 8. Both slackers and zealots accept the
contract; zealots invest in expertise level e and are promoted while stackers do not invest
and are not promoted. Zealots then undertake policy making e¤ort adened in Lemma 2
and recommend a project if and only if they discover X > 0. If central review reveals Y > 0
the Boss accepts the project. Otherwise he accepts the recommendation if and only if p  p:
Proof. Follows from above Lemmata. QED
Type II Agencies. In a Type II agency, where the post-promotion outside wage si is
highly responsive to demonstrated expertise, the managerial wage must track the available
outside wage after promotion, otherwise promoted employees will exit for the private sector.
And, it is highly desirable to set the managerial wage to induce sorting, so that both slackers
and zealots acquire expertise and are promoted but only zealots choose to remain with
agency. Sorting avoids paying the managerial wage to slackers who will not engage in policy
work if promoted. Moreover, the least-cost sorting wage is actually lower than the least-cost
non-sorting age (that is, one that induces slackers to remain in the agency as well as zealots).
Examination of Equation 8 indicates that the least-cost sorting wage is
wm = si   (p)e = wc + e2   (p)e
Recall from Lemma 7 that if si   ke2 varies in e then wc must adjust. The required
relation is that wc  sc + sm   si + ke2 and the least-cost entry wage is then
wc =
sc + sm   e2(  k)
2
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As we assume   k, entry wages fall in the promotion standard e:
The Bosss expected second period utility, given a promoted zealot, remains that shown
in Equation 10:
EuB2 j = 1 =
8><>: a
(pYH + (1  )(1  p)YL)  wm if p  p
(apYH)  wm if p < p
However, the Bosss expected utility at the design stage is now:
EuB = v   wc + (1  )(0) + (EuB2 j = 1)
= v   wc + (EuB2 j = 1)










[ 4e2   2(e2(k   ) + sc + sm) +
2eXH (pYH + (1  p)(1  )YL) (1  (1  p)) + eX2H (1  (1  p))2]




[ 2 (e(k   ) + sc + sm) (1 + ) + e
  4e+ p2XH (XH + 2YH) 2]
The following results follow straightforwardly:
Lemma 10. In a Type II agency, the optimal level of politicization and optimal promotion
standard are:
(p; YH ; YL; XH) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if p < p
XH+2YL+p(YH YL)
(1 p)(XH+2YL) if p
  p  p
0 if p > p
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e(p; YH ; YL; XH ; k) =
8>>>><>>>>:
p2XH(XH+2YH)




  p  p
XH(XH+2(p(YH YL)+YL))
4[(1+3)k (1+)] if p > p





Proof. The proof is virtually identical to that of Lemma 7, and is omitted for brevity.
The results for politicization are the same as for Type I agencies, however those for the
promotion standard di¤er slightly.
Proposition 11. In a Type II agency the following is an equilibrium. The Boss o¤ers the




wm = si   (p)e = wc + e2   (p)e and e and  are dened in Lemma 10. Both slackers
and zealots accept the contract and both invest in expertise to the promotion standard e
and are promoted. Slackers then exit the agency while zealots remain and undertake policy
making e¤ort adened in Lemma 2. Promoted zealots recommend a project if and only if
they discover X > 0. If central review reveals Y > 0 the Boss accepts the project. Otherwise
he accepts the recommendation if and only if p  p:
Proof. Follows from above Lemmata. QED
D. Examples
It may be useful to examine briey two simple examples that illustrate screening and
sorting in action.11
Screening in a Type I Agency. Consider a Type I agency. Type I agencies operate
in an environment in which outside employers do not particularly value the expertise acquired
by managers in the agency. More formally, we require that at e; si wc < c(e). The preceding
section has argued that such agencies can motivate zealots to acquire costly expertise and
assume supervisory roles in the agency while screening out slackers from the top ranks of
the agency. This is important because slackers, unlike zealots, shirk their policy work.
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Table 6: EU of Slacker-type in Type I Agency
Stay Exit
Invest :42 1:02
Dont Invest 1:1 1:05
Table 7: EU of Zealot-type in Type I Agency
Stay Exit
Invest 1:1 1:02
Dont Invest 1:1 1:05
The following example shows the screening equilibrium at work. In the example, the
values for the parameters are: XH = 1=2, YH = 1, YL =  1, p = 2=3, k = 1=36, sc = 1=2,
sm = 6=10, si = 2=3. In the example p < p < p (using the appropriate denitions,
1=2 < 2=3 < 3=4). Thus, politicization should take an "intermediate" value rather a corner
solution of 0 or 1.
In fact, using the formulae derived earlier, we calculate that the Boss o¤ers the contract
(e = 8=3; wc = :55; wm = :62) and then politicizes the agency to the level  = 1=3. Thus,
the agency o¤ers higher entry-level wages than does the private sector. Because the cost of
training to the promotion standard e is ke2 = :20 the agency is a Type I agency (we require
si   wc < c(e) which here is :67  :55 < :20).
Will these wages and promotion standard induce screening, given the level of politiciza-
tion and outside wage? In other words, will a slacker decline to invest in expertise and remain
with the agency, while a zealot does invest, receive a promotion into the policy making ranks,
and remain with the agency? Tables 2 and 3 indicate the expected utilities of slackers and
zealots as they make decision about investment and exit. It is (relatively) straightforward
to calculate the values of the expected utilities in the example. These are shown in Tables 6
and 8.
First consider the slacker. The screening equilibrium requires him not to invest in
expertise and to remain in the agency as a clerk. As shown, this is clearly the best option
for the slacker. The wages received by a slacker who follows the prescribed actions leave
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him exactly indi¤erent between a public sector career and a private sector one (as sc + sm =
1:1 = 2wc).
Now consider the zealot. The screening equilibrium requires the zealot to invest in
expertise, become a manager, and remain with the agency. As shown, a zealot has no
protable deviation from these choices. Indeed, the managerial wage has been set so that a
zealot is just indi¤erent between seeking promotion and remaining a clerk, given the cost of
training up to the promotion standard.
The key in constructing the equilibrium is that the zealot prizes the policy making job
more than does the slacker, because he expects to derive job satisfaction from setting policy
in a job that would otherwise be vacant. As shown, the zealots net return from investment
and promotion, 1.1, is considerably larger than that of the slacker, .42. This reects the
policy returns so valued by zealots.
Sorting in a Type II Agency. Now consider a Type II agency. Type II agencies
operate in an environment in which outside employers highly value the expertise acquired
by managers in the agency. More formally, we require that at e; si(e)   wc > c(e). (Our
parameterization of the si(e) and c(e) functions guarantees that this requirement is satised
for any value of e > 0 when  > k.)The preceding section has argued that Type II agencies
can set wages and promotion standards that motivate zealots and slackers to sort themselves
from one another. In particular, wages and standards can be set so that both will acquire
costly expertise, but only the zealot will remain with the agency. The slacker will depart for
pastures he sees as greener.
We retain the same parameters from the preceding example. However, now the outside
wage si is not xed but reects the employees acquisition of expertise, as demonstrated by
agency promotion. In addition, the equilibrium requires a specication of , the percentage
of zealots in the agencys clerks. In this example we assume  = 1=2: Finally, we assume
 = 1=25:
Using the formulae derived earlier, we calculate the Boss now o¤ers the contract (e =
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Table 8: EU of Slacker-type in Type II Agency
Stay Exit
Invest :93 1:1
Dont Invest :96 :98
Table 9: EU of Zealot-type in Type II Agency
Stay Exit
Invest 1:1 1:1
Dont Invest :96 :98
25=13; wc = :48; wm = :78) and then politicizes the agency to the level  = 2=3. To
promoted employees, the private sector o¤ers the wage si = :95, which is considerably higher
than the wage the agency pays its promoted policy makers. In addition, the agency o¤ers a
somewhat lower entry-level wage than does the private sector. The cost of training to the
level e is ke2 = :10. The agency is indeed a Type II agency (we require si wc > c(e) which
here is :95  :48 > :10).
Will these wages and promotion standard induce sorting, given the level of politicization
and outside wage? In other words, will both slackers and zealots invest in expertise and
receive promotion, with the zealots opting to remain in the agency as policy makers while
the slackers depart for the private sector? Again we calculate the expected utilities of di¤erent
actions for the actors and display them, here in Tables 8 and 9. As shown, the best choice for
the slacker is to invest and depart. The prescribed action for the zealot is to invest and stay,
and as indicated he has no incentive to deviate from this action. The agency wage has been
set so that a promoted zealot is just indi¤erent between staying and going. However, a zealot
does much better staying than would a slacker (1.1 versus .93). As the agency economizes
at its available margins, both slackers and zealots are indi¤erent between public and private
careers.
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IV. Micro-Foundations of the Competence-Control Trade-o¤
As has been widely discussed in recent years, public agencies display a sharp trade-o¤
between administrative competence and political control . Lewis 2008 for example employs a
measure of bureau performance and nds lower performance in bureaus with many political
appointees. Many mechanisms might give rise to a competence-control trade-o¤, for instance,
the simple replacement of high-quality civil servants with lower-quality but more politically
loyal appointees. However, the model highlights one mechanism and thus micro-founds
the trade-o¤. In particular, as policy disagreement between the Boss and subordinates
increases (that is, as p falls), the Boss alters agency design, increasing politicization and
lowering promotion standards and thus human capital among public sector managers 
while adjusting wages accordingly.
First consider the e¤ect of policy agreement p on politicization . Using the results in the
two propositions,lower levels of policy agreement p lead to higher levels of politicization. This
e¤ect is shown in Figure 7.12 As shown there, politicization decreases (weakly) monotonically
as policy agreement (p) increases. The three politicization regimes are clear in the gure:
when the likelihood of disagreement is high (the high conict environment), the Boss fully
politicizes so that he audits every recommendation of the subordinate; when disagreement
is moderate, levels of politicization are moderate; and when the likelihood of disagreement
is low, the Boss does not politicize at all.
Now consider the e¤ect of policy agreement on the promotion standard, as shown in
Figure 8 for a Type II agency. In both Type I and Type II agencies, expertise increases
monotonically as the likelihood of policy agreement increases. The e¤ect of the jump at
the cross-over from a high-conict environment to a low-conict environment is clear in the
gure; it occurs in both types of agencies.
One can combine both gures to show the politicization-expertise frontier. This is done
in Figure 9 for a Type II agency. The gure shows the (e; )  tuple for various values of
p ranging from 0 to 1. As shown, high values of agreement result in low politicization and
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Figure 7: Policy Agreement and Politicization
Figure 8: Policy Agreement and the Promotion Standard
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Figure 9: The Competence-Control Tradeo¤
a high promotion standard, leading to public sector managers with high levels of human
capital. In contrast, low levels of policy agreement lead to high levels of politicization and a
low promotion standard, hence, poorly skilled public managers.
The logic underlying the frontier shown in Figure 9 is fairly straightforward. First, high
conict (low p) drives the Boss to politicize decision-making, to protect himself from policy
recommendations with which he disagrees. This degrades job satisfaction for intrinsically
motivated managers so the Boss must increase the managerial wage, if he maintains the
same promotion standard. But in addition, the low level of policy agreement between the
Boss and the manager makes the work e¤ort of the manager less valuable to the Boss, so
he is unwilling to pay highly for their work. Consequently, the Boss lowers the promotion
standard.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
We have argued that public agencies face a pervasive dual-contracting problem: it is
di¢ cult for agency leaders and civil servants to contract on worker performance, and hard for
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politicians to refrain from self-interested meddling in agency policy-making. Both problems
inuence the ability of public agencies to recruit, train, motivate, and retain expert employ-
ees, employees whose performance a¤ects public agency performance. We have explored how
wage structures and promotion standards respond to, and partially mitigate, the dual con-
tracting problem by sorting "slackers" from "zealots." The analysis highlights the di¤erences
between what we have called Type I agencies, where managers have few attractive outside
opportunities, and Type II agencies, where high-level manager have lucrative opportunities
in the private sector. The analysis also provides micro-foundations for the trade-o¤ between
political control and agency competence.
Although the model contains many stages it makes a series of integrated predictions not
only about wage structures and promotion standards, but human capital acquisition, career
paths, politicization levels, employee work e¤ect, and agency performance including rates
of agency policy innovation. The model provides a framework for exploring how changes in
outside wages, shocks to policy disagreement between political overseers and career managers
due to changes in party control of government, and shocks to agency wages from wage freezes
have systematic impacts on the operation of public agencies, and di¤erent impacts across
Type I and Type II agencies. These rich predictions might well be taken to data, especially
data from agenciesinternal personnel records.
The model has implications for e¤orts to reform public agencies. Disappointment with
public agency performance has led elected o¢ cials world-wide to pursue fundamental reorga-
nizations of public agencies. Elected o¢ cials typically seek measures that facilitate greater
political control of the bureaucracy, modifying public sector personnel systems (Suleiman
2003). The model suggests that e¤orts to enhance political control can have perverse con-
sequences for agency performance. The prospect of increased meddling will lead to reduced
worker e¤ort and ultimately lower promotion standards. Lower promotion standards im-
ply less expert managers, a atter salary structure, and fewer high-quality projects. Reform
programs targeting personnel systems  entry and managerial pay, benets, promotion stan-
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dards, and so on  thus have strong implications for the ability of the agency to cultivate
cadres of top quality managers.
A Longer Proofs
Lemma 1
Proof. First consider the managers recommendation strategy r(). In light of Equation 1,
any deviation from the indicated strategy brings a loss to a zealot-type manager given the
indicated decision strategy d(), and in fact would do so whenever there is a positive
probability the Boss accepts the proposed policy project. Because a slacker-type manager
is indi¤erent between XL and XH , he has no incentive to deviate to "recommend" if either
X = XL or X = XH . (As will become clear in the next Lemma, X = XH is actually
o¤ the equilibrium path if the manager is a slacker.) If one assumes an  cost to the
manager from a positive recommendation, then a slacker has a disincentive to deviate from
the indicated strategy regardless of X. Now consider the Bosss decision strategy. Clearly,
if informed the Boss will reject the recommended project if Y = YL and accept if Y = YH .
If uninformed, Boss will accept if YH + (1   )YL > 0, where  denotes Bosss posterior
belief that Y = YH given being uninformed and managers recommendation strategy. From
BayesRule conditional on a positive recommendation, given the managers recomendation
strategy and that  is independent of the state (X; Y ),  = p. Hence, Boss will accept when
uninformed if pYH + (1   p)YL > 0 ) p    YLYH YL . If p <  
YL
YH YL Boss will reject when
uninformed. QED
Lemma 4
Proof. First consider slackers ( = 0). A slacker invests only to be promoted since he receives
no satisfaction from policy-making per se. Consequently, if he invests at all, he invests the
minimum to be promoted, e: Promotion will be worthwhile only if the best post-promotion
opportunity is su¢ ciently remunerative to o¤set training costs; otherwise the slacker will
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remain a clerk, either in the public or private sectors, depending on which clerkship pays
more. The investment strategy of slackers follows immediately. Second, consider zealots
( = 1). The following point is important. A zealots expected utility from being promoted
and remaining with the agency is wm+e ke2, which is concave in e and reaches a maximum
of wm + 14
2
k
at e = 
2k
. Given this, behavior in a Type I agency is straightforward: If
e > 
2k
but if even so, promotion is better than non-promotion, the zealot will invest to e:
If e < 
2k
and if promotion is better than non-promotion, the zealot will invest to 
2k
. If
non-promotion is better than promotion, the zealot will not invest at all as doing gains him
nothing and is costly. Behavior in a Type II agency is somewhat more complex. If e > 
2k
and promotion is better than non-promotion, then whether staying or going is the better
post-promotion option, the zealot only invests to e as further investment only hurts him. If
e < 
2k
a zealot will invest in expertise beyond e to e = 
2k
but only if doing so and remaining
with the agency is better than investing just to the promotion standard and leaving for the
private sector (that is, if wm + 14
2
k
 so(e)   ke2) and such an investment is better than
remaining a clerk either in the public or private sectors (wm+ 14
2
k
 max fsc; wcg): However,
if the outside wage is su¢ ciently high, then the zealot invests just to the promotion standard
and departs (again, if doing so is better than remaining a clerk). Finally, if remaining a clerk
is better than the best post-promotion option, the zealot remains a clerk. QED
Lemma 6
Proof. 1a. The conjectured equilibrium requires for slackers 2wc  sc + sm, which implies
wc  sc+sm2 . 1b. If slackers are indi¤erent then wc = sc+sm2 and sc+sm = 2wc:The conjectured
equilibrium requires for zealots wc + wm + e   ke2  sc + sm, and the result follows
immediately. 2a. Given indi¤erence, the conjecture equilibrium requires both wc + wm +
e  ke2 = sc + sm and wc + si   ke2 = sc + sm. Hence wc +wm + e  ke2 = wc + si   ke2,
or wm + e = si. 2b. The conjectured equilibrium requires that wc + si   ke2 = sc + sm.
Clearly if si   ke2 varies in e then wc must adjust to maintain the equality. QED
43
Lemma 7 (Optimal promotion standard and politicization in Type I agencies).
Proof. First, note that because  is a probability it is bounded by 0 and 1, while e must
be non-negative. Hence it is necessary to consider corner solutions where  = 1 or 0 and
e = 0. However, for interior solutions one need only examine the rst order conditions for
maximizing Equation 11 (where p 2 [  YL
YH YL ; 1]) and (where p 2 [0; 
YL
YH YL ]). For the
former, the relevant partial derivatives are:
@
@
EuB2 () =  
XHe
2




XH (1  (1  p))
2

(pYH + (1  ) (1  p)YL) + 1
2
XH (1  (1  p) )

  2ke
Setting both to zero and solving simultaneously yields (p; YH ; YL; XH) =
XH+2YL+p(YH YL)
(1 p)(XH+2YL)
and e(p; YH ; YL; XH ; k) =  p2XH(YH YL)2(XH+2YL)8k respectively. Note that these solutions require
XH + 2YL < 0. In addition,  =
XH+2YL+p(YH YL)
(1 p)(XH+2YL) = 0 at p =  
XH+2YL
YH YL  p, implying
 = 0 for values of p > p. But, given  = 0 @
@e
EuB2 () =  8ek+XH [XH+2(p(YH YL)+YL]4 implying
e = XH(XH+2(p(YH YL)+YL))
8k










 8ek + p2XH(XH + 2YH)2
4





Lemma 10 (Optimal promotion standard and politicization in Type II agencies)
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 7. The Bosss maximand is indicated in




sc Entry-level wage in the private-sector
sm Second-period (expected) wage in the private-sector
si Private sector wage for promoted public-sector employee, either sc or so
so Outside wage available post-promotion in Type II agencies, so = sc + e2
wc Entry-level wage in the public-sector
wm Managerial wage for promoted public-sector employee
p Policy agreement between public employee and Boss, pr(YH jXH)
X Value to employee of project, either XL or XH
Y Value to Boss of project, either YL or YH
 Politicization level, probability Boss learns Y via central review, set by Boss
EY Expected value of policy-making to Boss
r Manager recommends the project (r = 1) or does not (r = 0)
 Element of Bosss information set fYH ; YL;?g (? connotes uninformative review)
d Boss accepts project (d = 1) or rejects project (d = 0)
e Level of investment in expertise of public-sector employee
e Promotion standard in the public sector, set by Boss
a Policy-making e¤ort, probability of worker creating an XH project
 Type of employee, either slacker ( = 0) or zealot ( = 1)
v Value to Boss of clerk services
1; 2 Intrinsic motivation of zealots in high p and low p environments, from policy-making
c(e; k) Cost of investment in expertise is c(e) = ke2
c(a; e) Cost policy-making action, c(a; e) = a where  = 1=e
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1Following the arguments in Baker, Gibbons, Murphy 1999, we do not regard politiciza-
tion and meddling as contractable: a pledge not to politicize is not credible, and if the Boss
has installed a centralized review capacity, he will use it.
2In contrast with Aghion and Tirole 1997, we do not allow the Boss to independently
craft his own policy projects. Although such a degree of centralizaiton sometimes occurs,
it simply reproduces the same principal-agent tensions we study. Instead we closely follow
Baker, Gibbons, Murphy 1999.
3For simplicity we assume wc is net of e¤ort costs in the clerk job.
4This sequence of play allows us to consider not only the exit decision of a non-promoted
subordinate, but that of a promoted manager in the face of a new Boss who increases
politicization. The promotion outcome becomes public knowledge; the employees exact
performance evaluation does not so that a private sector employer can condition its wage on
the former but not the latter.
5Although we use the word "recommendation," the game structure is not equivalent to
cheap talk. The failure to recommend a project constrains the Bosss action space: he cannot
opt for any project.
6The Boss may not really su¤er disutility from paying wages to the Subordinate as gov-
ernment agencies do not get to retain earnings (for a discussion see Wilson 1989). But at
least for agency design, we imagine the Boss trying to conserve on wages, perhaps due to
congressional pressure.
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7In the language of typical Human Resources personnel evaluations, the employee "Takes
collective responsibility for total organizations successes and failures within the scope of
inuence."
8If an "in and outer" zealot felt some residual or discounted decision ownership, then this
feeling could e¤ect his exit decision. In particular, if his position were immediately lled
with another capable manager, then exit would appear more attractive. However, if he were
likely to be replaced by a poor decision-maker, exit would be less attractive.
9In equilibrium, in Type I agencies the zealots will be promoted and become managers
while the slackers will remain clerks. In Type II agencies, both will be promoted.
10Note that we do not allow Type I agencies to compete with Type II agencies over
employees. That is, the market for potential meat inspectors (say) is distinct from the
market for potential anti-trust lawyers.
11The examples require considerable calculation. A Mathematica program to calculate all
the values in the example will be placed on Camerons webpage.
12The gures in this section assume YH = 1, YL =  1, XH = 14 , k = 136 , and  = 125 . Thus
p = 1
2
and p = 7
8
.
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